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1 INTRODUCTION
The potential macroeconomic impact of the creation,
accumulation, and use of counterpart funds can be
significant. To ensure consistency between objectives
and instruments, the impact of counterpart funds2
should be taken into account in the design of
macroeconomic and structural adjustment programmes,
including those supported by financing from the
International Monetary Fund (Fund). One conclusion
of this article is that the time factor is important, as the
creation or accumulation and the use of counterpart
funds can have opposite effects on the money supply
and on the overall government budget deficit. The
creation or accumulation of counterpart funds
contributes to a reduction in the money supply and
therefore is consistent with the restrictive demand
management policies that are often needed to achieve a
viable balance of payments position and a sustainable
rate of growth with price stability. In contrast, the use
of counterpart funds has the opposite effect and is, in
most instances, inflationary. Therefore, a great deal of
confusion exists with respect to the macroeconomic
impact of these funds, which often renders the
exchange of views difficult and leads to wrong policy
recommendations. Another conclusion is that the
earmarking of counterpart funds for specific uses by
donors is not efficient because money is fungible.
Instead, donors should attempt to ensure that their
policy advice is adequately reflected in the overall
design of the recipient government's public expenditure
programmes and budgetary policies.
Section 2 describes the Fund's approach to its financial
assistance and provides an overview of the main
elements of macroeconomic and structural adjustment
programmes supported by the use of Fund resources;
Section 3 describes the donors' approaches to
counterpart funds; Section 4 analyzes the macro-
economic impact of counterpart funds; and Section 5
summarizes the conclusion of the paper.3
The author would like to thank his colleagues from the Fund, in
particular Messrs. Williams, Bornemano, Basu, Carstens and Mrs.
Bungay for their comments and suggestions, The views expressed in
the present paper are the author's alone and do not necessarily reflect
the views of the International Monetary Fund.
Although the notion of counterpart funds is well known to
economists and officials from foreign aid donor and recipient
countries, the definition of these funds varies widely. In this paper,
counterpart funds are defined as the local currency proceeds of the
sales of commodities and of foreign exchange provided by foreign aid
in the forms of grants or loans to the recipient government. For
further details on definition of counterpart funds, see Bruton and
Hill 1990; Maxwell 1991; and Clément 1989.
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2 FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE BY THE FUND
AND ADJUSTMENT PROGRAMMES
The Fund's financial assistance is provided to member
countries for balance of payments - rather than
budgetary - support, except in countries belonging to
monetary unions (such as some countries in West and
Central Africa) where Fund resources can be used
directly as budgetary support. The Fund disburses its
financial assistance through arrangements under a
number of facilities.4 Under all these arrangements, the
transaction entails an exchange of one asset for another
- the recipient country acquires other currencies
(usually those of the major industrial countries) in
exchange for its domestic currency. These transactions
take place between the Fund and the country's
monetary authorities, usually the Central Bank. Fund
disbursements are treated as a financing item - that is,
they are below the line in the balance of payments and
are shown as part of the net foreign assets of the
monetary authorities, To the extent that these funds are
subsequently used by the government for financing the
budget, they are regarded as domestic financing from
the banking system. Countries may adopt different
internal accounting practices. The use of Fund
resources does not result in the creation of counterpart
funds by recipient governments.5
The main objectives of a programme with the Fund are
to attain or safeguard a viable balance of payments,
while achieving a sustainable rate of growth with price
stability. The achievement of these objectives generally
requires policies that restrain aggregate demand and
improve economic efficiency. While the mix of policies
depends on the specific circumstances of the country,
fund-supported programmes emphasize two main
instruments for controlling aggregate demand:
monetary (or domestic credit) policy, and government
tax and expenditure policy.6 As the creation or
accumulation, and the use of counterpart funds,
For details on the macroeconomic impact of counterpart funds,
notably on the balance of payments, money and the government
budget, see J. A. P. Clément, 1989, op. cit.
The IMF financial resources are made available to its members
through a variety of facilities and policies, which differ mainly in the
type of balance of payments needs and with the degree of
conditionality attached to them (IMF 1991).
More details on the treatment of Fund accounts in money and
banking statistics are provided in ¡MF 1958; and ¡MF 1984,
paragraphs 527-559.
On the design of Fund's programmes and conditionality, see Guitiàn
1981; Khan and Knight 1985; and IMF 1987.
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depending on the magnitude, can have important
effects on monetary policy as well as on budgetary
policy, they have to be duly taken into account to
ensure consistency between macroeconomic objectives
and instruments.
Because of the links between monetary flow, public
sector spending, and aggregate demand, monetary
policy is an essential demand management tool. The
importance of domestic credit in influencing domestic
and external balance provides the basis for the
formulation of monetary policy in terms of domestic
expansion either by the Central Bank or the banking
system as a whole. In this context, the impact of
counterpart funds on total domestic credit and net
credit to government should be taken into account in
order to ensure consistency with the programmed
monetary expansion.
Fiscal imbalances stemming from expenditure levels
that exceed the public sector's revenue are often the
primary cause of an unsustainable expansion in
aggregate demand and the consequent weaknesses in
the balance of payments. In Fund-supported pro-
grammes, the correction of fiscal imbalances normally
entails measures to restrain public expenditure while
improving the expenditure structure. Therefore, total
government expenditure - including that financed
through the use of counterpart funds - is a key
variable to be monitored. In this context, to strengthen
the monitoring of public expenditure, the adjustment
package very often includes a comprehensive and
coherent public expenditure programme as well as a
public investment programme. However, the ear-
marking of counterpart funds for certain expenditures,
which leads very often to the creation of special
accounts outside the budgetary process, renders the
monitoring of public expenditure difficult. The
earmarking of counterpart funds can also result in a
structure of public expenditure that is not necessarily
the most appropriate at the macroeconomic level, nor is
it necessarily consistent with the objectives that are
typically included in any public expenditure programme
designed with the help of the Fund and the World
Bank. Even though each earmarking at a microeconomic
level or at a particular donor level might appear
appropriate, the sum of all the donors' requests could
very well be inappropriate at the macroeconomic level
and work against the best allocation of resources in the
light of a country's particular needs. In addition, the
more stringent the conditions imposed by donors, the
Obviously, the speed of accumulation of counterpart funds would
vary depending on the type and design of projects, the programming
and implementation capacity of the recipient country, and the
complexity of procedures attached by the donors to the use of
counterpart funds, as well as the rate of increase of foreign aid.
8 In the monetary survey, foreign-owned counterpart funds are
usually included in foreign liabilities as 'foreign lending funds'
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more likely that the time lapse between the creation and
the use of counterpart funds would exceed one or more
fiscal years. If such a lapse between the creation and the
use of counterpart funds does extend beyond a single
fiscal year, this lack of simultaneity could have
important macroeconomic effects. These effects would
vary with the magnitude of the counterpart funds
accumulated7 in a given country as described in
Section 4.
3 DONORS' APPROACHES RELATING TO
COUNTERPART FUNDS
Counterpart funds are generated in various ways:
donors differ in the ways counterpart funds are created
and in the conditions attached to their use (Figure 1). It
is essential to understand the features of these funds,
especially if they are sizable, in order to assess their
macroeconomic impact and to ensure consistency in
macroeconomic programming:
a Sources of counterpart funds, i.e., grants vs. loans.
The accrual of counterpart funds from grants is
permanent, whereas loans will have to be repaid in the
future, requiring the recipient government to raise a
corresponding amount of local currency.
b Forms of initial donor assistance, i.e. in cash or in
kind. When aid is provided in the form of cash, the
foreign exchange can be sold by the recipient
government to the Central Bank, other entities in the
public sector, and the commercial banks, as well as to
the nonfinancial private sector. When aid is provided in
the fom of commodities, counterpart funds are created
only after the commodities have been sold to the
nonfinancial private and public sectors.
c Ownership of funds, i.e. donors versus recipients.
Donors may require that part of all the counterpart
funds be owned either by the recipient government or
by the donor government or, sometimes, jointly.
d Freedom to use counterpart funds by the recipient
government, i.e. whether uses are 'tied' to the
financing of predetermined expenditure. In many
cases, the recipient government is required to open a
separate account for the funds, and the use of these
funds is often determined outside the budgetary
process. In other cases, 'untied' counterpart funds
cannot be distinguished from other unearmarked
budgetary resources, as the recipient government can
use them at its own discretion.8
whereas country-owned counterpart funds are usually included in
'government deposits', although in some instances, particularly for
purposes of historical analysis, they are distinguished from the usable
government deposits by being classified as 'government lending
funds'. For more details, see IMF 1984, op. cit., paragraphs 48 1-84.
Also, for details on the accounting treatment of foreign aid in the
balance of payments, see IMF 1977.
4 MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
COUNTERPART FUNDS
The macroeconomic impacts of counterpart funds
differ, depending on the specific features noted above,
but typically the accumulation of such funds is
deflationary. In most cases, the creation and
accumulation of counterpart funds are deflationary, as
they entail a shift of money from the private sector to
the government sector, together with a decrease in net
credit to the government, assuming that financial
policies are not modified to offset the deflationary
effect (Table 1). The accumulation of counterpart
funds would therefore generally reinforce those policies
aimed at reducing inflationary pressures and narrowing
the balance of payments deficit.
A drawdown of such funds with the Central Bank and the
commercial banks will increase net public sector borrowing from the
banking system. The extent of the drawdown will therefore need to
be set within the overall fiscal and monetary framework and may have
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The macroeconomic impact of the uses of counterpart
funds is the reverse of that of the accumulation of funds
and therefore tends to be inflationary.9 The government
may use these funds to repay debt to the Central Bank;
to repay its debt to the public, which would free
budgetary resources for other expenditure already
planned; or to provide direct financing of expenditure
that may otherwise not be undertaken (Table 2). The
precise macroeconomic effect depends on the timing of
such uses, following the initial provision of foreign
assistance. If the creation and the use of counterpart
funds take place simultaneously, the macroeconomic
impact is neutralized. However, if the use of these
funds takes place long after the goods obtained through
the foreign aid have been consumed by the private
sector, or after the foreign exchange untied to private
to be offset by lower government borrowing elsewhere. The use of
counterpart funds has to be properly designed, and only then would
it not be inflationary.
Figure 1: Creation, Accumulation, and Uses of Counterpart Funds*
st,
Donors provide
foreign aid
in kind
or
in foreign exchange
(grants or loans
to
recipient
Government
Counterpart
Funds
sis
Execution of
budget including
programs and
projects
Creation of counterpart
funds: Foreign aid sold
to nongovernmental sector
Use of
counterpart funds
(tied or untied)
Accumulation of
counterpart funds
Definition of counterpart funds: Local currency proceeds of the sales of commodities and of
foreign aid in the form of grants or loans to the recipient government.
* The impact of the creation, accumulation and uses of counterpart funds on the money supply and the government budget are
described, respectively in Tables I and 2.
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Table 1: Creation or Accumulation and Use of Counterpart Funds - Their Impacts
on Net Credit to Government and Money Supply
Sources of Creation of counterpart funds
Foreign aid in commodity grants Foreign aid in grants or loans in foreign exchange
Bought by the private sector Bought by
Bought by the private sector using to finance imports using the central bank
Deposits in Deposits in
Cash balances commercial banks Cash balances commercial banks
Recipient government deposits counterpart funds in
commer- central commer- central commer- central cOmmer- central commer- central
cial bank cial bank cial bank cial bank cial bank
banks banks banks banks banks
Direct effects on:
Net foreign reserves O O O O O O O O + +
Money supply .! - - - - - - 0' 0
Net credit to the
government - - - - - - - -
Use of counterpart funds2
Money supply
a. Repay debt to central
bank 0' 0 0' 0 0' 0 0' 0 0' 0
b. Repay debt to public + + + + + + + + + +
c. Finance budgetary
expenditure + + + + + + + + + +
Net credit to the
government
a. Repay debt to central
bank O O O O O O O O O O
b. Repay debt to public + + + + + + + + + +
e. Finance budgetary
expenditure + + + + + + + + + +
Simultaneous creation and use of counterpart funds2
Money supply
a. Repay debt to central
bank - -' - -' - 0' 0
b. Repay debt to public O O O O O O O O + +
c. Finance budgetary
expenditure O O O 0 0 0 0 0 + +
Net credit to the
government
a. Repay debt to central
bank - - - - - - - - -
b. Repay debt to public O O O O O O O O O O
c. Finance budgetary
expenditure O O O O O O O O O O
Note: - effect is a decrease, + effect is an increase, and O effect is neutral.
The commercial banks' potential to expand credit is higher.
2 Use of counterpart funds owned by recipient governments.
Source: J. A. P. Clément 1989.
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Table 2: Creation or Accumulation and Use of Counterpart Funds -
Their Im pacts on the Budget
Sources of creation or accumulation of counterpart funds
Grants Loans
Direct effects on:
Overall budget balance surplus O
Total net financing - O
Domestic - -
Net credit to the government - -
Domestic debt' O O
Foreign O +
Use of counterpart funds to
Finance Repay debt to Repay debt Repay foreign
expenditure central bank to public' debt
Overall budget balance deficit O O O
Total net financing + O O O
Domestic + O O +
Net credit to the government + O + +
Domestic debt O O - O
Foreign O O O -
Simultaneous creation and use of counterpart funds
For which the sources are grants For which the sources are loans
Repay Repay
debt Repay debt Repay
to debt Repay to debt Repay
Finance central to foreign Finance central to foreign
expenditure bank public debt expenditure bank public debt
Overall budget balance O surplus surplus surplus deficit O O O
Total net financing O - - + O O O
Domestic debt O - O + - - Ø
Net credit to the government O - O O O O O
Domestic debt O O O O O - O
Foreign O O O + + + o
Note: O effect is neutral, + effect is an increase, effect is a decrease.
Held by nonfinancial and nongovernmental sector.
Source: J. A. P. Clément 1989.
imports has been sold to the central bank by the
recipient government, such use is inflationary as it is
equivalent to domestic credit creation. Furthermore, in
those cases where counterpart funds have been
accumulated over several years, the backlog of such
funds could be very large in relation to the money
supply, which could potentially undermine the
programme's stabilization objectives.
In the context of Fund-supported adjustment
programmes, uses of counterpart funds can give rise to
inconsistency with the fiscal or credit targets, or with
the desired composition of expenditures, where use was
restricted to certain purposes. Indeed, for a given target
of net credit to the government, the greater the use of
restricted counterpart funds, the less the government's
degree of freedom in resource allocation. Additional
projects 'requested' by different donors may divert
scarce resources from a better use. An important issue
is therefore the ranking of development projects
according to their economic rate of return rather than
to donors' particular sectoral interests. In countries
with nonexistent or poor project evaluation capacity,
this ranking is very difficult. This does not imply,
however, that counterpart funds financing additional
projects requested by donors is a better solution; i.e.
that donors know better how to allocate the recipient
country's resources remains to be demonstrated.
Given the above, a better solution would appear to be
for donors to renounce both the accumulated counter-
part funds and the creation of new ones. In other words,
the donors should be encouraged to untie the use of
existing and new counterpart funds. However, for
political reasons, donors have to justify to their
taxpayers the use of their foreign aid. Therefore, in
exchange for 'untying' counterpart funds, the donors
should be assured that these funds would be fully
integrated in the design of adjustment programmes
supported by the Fund and the World Bank. At the
same time, advance consultations between major
donors and the international institutions would have to
take place to enhance aid coordination. The timely
coordination of aid should ensure a better integration of
donors' programmes and projects within a coherent
macroeconomic framework that would include the
sectoral priorities of public expenditure, including
investment. Better aid coordination would also remove
the pressure on the recipient government to earmark
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